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In U.S. libel law, courts have struggled to implement the various
elements of libel into ruling standards. Specifically, they have sought to
find consistency in classifying individuals to determine actual malice, in
defining the meaning of defamatory words, and categorizing harm
resulting from libel in cases involving the free press.

Elements of Actual Malice
■ The landmark case New York Times Co v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) changed libel law
standards and created the notion of separate
classifications of individuals who file libel
lawsuits and what they must prove.
■ The Supreme Court and lower courts hold
public figures, public officials and limitedpurpose public figures most prove actual malice
in order to win damages in libel suits. The Second
and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals base their
definition of actual malice from the standard set
in New York Times Co.
■ Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
(1967) defined further the difference between
individuals in terms of libel suits.
■ The Second and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
interpret actual malice as falsity or a reckless
disregard for the truth. Furthermore, both courts
look for ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that there
is actual malice.
■ The lower courts have determined and refined
the classification of individuals through their own
terms and interpretation.
■ Due to the evolution of communication, it is
necessary to reexamine and reevaluate the actual
malice standard to ensure it is applicable still in
today’s legal world.

Definitions of Defamatory
■ The court opinion of Janklow v. Newsweek
Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (1986) reinforced the
importance of implication, as Justice Arnold
wrote, “A defamatory communication may consist
of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a
statement of this nature is actionable only if it
implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory
facts as the basis for the opinion.”
■ In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1
(1990), Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered a
Supreme Court decision that supported the notion
of determining defamatory meaning through
implication of a statement of fact. Rehnquist
noted that, “The falsity of the speaker’s beliefs
and opinions are not at issue; rather, it is the
falsity of the implied defamatory statement of fact
that is critical.”
■ A 1992 Iowa Law Review by C. Thomas Dienes
and Lee Levine explained how the author can
have varying states of awareness of the
defamation, all which can still result in a libel
action. “The defamatory meaning may arise
innocently, negligently, knowingly, or
deliberately. The publisher … may not have even
considered the meaning that the plaintiff seeks to
attribute to the publication.”

Definitions of Harm
■ Both circuits define harm as result from
statements about a plaintiff’s alleged criminal
conduct, loathsome diseases, misconduct in their
personal professional or occupation, or sexual
misconduct.
■ Bodily harm: as sickness or disease, including
required care, loss of services and death that
results from the libelous statement.
■ Pecuniary or special harm: intentional and
improper interference with another's prospective
contractual relation, whether the interference
consists of inducing or otherwise causing a third
person not to enter into or continue the
prospective relation or preventing the other from
acquiring or continuing the prospective relation.
The statement in question would have to be
considered defamation per quod.
■ Emotional harm: encompasses distortion or
discomforture caused by the defamatory
statements. The harm done to the plaintiff’s
psyche must be considered extreme and severe in
order to hold up in court.

